

## 第50回国際原子力機関(IAEA)総会等の結果について

平成18年9月26日

内閣府原子力政策担当室

松田岩夫大臣(科学技術政策担当)が、9月18日(月)からオーストリア共和国ウィーンで開催された第50回国際原子力機関(IAEA)総会に政府代表として出席し、政府代表演説を行い、また、同日、米国及び仏国の政府代表及びIAEA事務局と個別会談を行った。

近藤原子力委員長は、9月19日(火)から21日(木)にかけて開催された第50回IAEA総会特別イベントにスピーカとして出席し、発表を行った。

### 1. 出張者

松田岩夫大臣(科学技術政策担当)を政府代表とし、以下、天野之弥 在ウィーン国際機関日本政府代表部特命全権大使、内閣府、外務省、文部科学省及び経済産業省の担当官が参加。原子力委員会からは、近藤委員長及び町委員が参加。

### 2. 日程

9月18日(月) IAEA総会日本政府代表演説  
9月19日(火)～21日(木) 第50回IAEA総会特別イベント

### 3. IAEA総会結果概要

#### (1)政府代表演説(要旨)(全文は別添1)

- ・我が国は唯一の被爆国として世界に核廃絶を訴えていく使命を持ち、来年のIAEA設立50周年を前に、すべての国に対し核廃絶を改めて訴える。
- ・我が国において、来年4月、設立50周年を記念する原子力エネルギーに関するシンポジウムをIAEAと共同で開催する。
- ・原子力政策大綱に明記したとおり、平和的利用に限定しつつ核燃料サイクルの確立を図ることを基本とし、高速増殖炉サイクル技術の研究開発を進め、国際的に貢献する。
- ・核燃料供給保証に関する六カ国構想を補完するものとして「核燃料供給登録システム」の構築を提案する。(別添2参照。)
- ・リビアの大量破壊兵器の放棄に対し、他国が見習うことのできるモデルとなるよう、リビアに対してできる限りの協力を行うべき。

- ・北朝鮮が、早期かつ無条件で六者協議に復帰すること及び共同声明の履行に着手することを強く求める。
- ・イランの核問題について、イランがウラン濃縮活動を直ちに停止した上で、交渉のテーブルに戻ることを強く求める。
- ・核セキュリティに関するIAEAセミナーを本年11月に東京においてホストする予定。
- ・アジア原子力協力フォーラム(FNCA)は、アフリカなど他の地域の平和的利用の推進にも有効であり、我が国として、このような枠組みの強化に積極的に貢献する。
- ・我が国は科学技術の先進国として、技術革新の成果を積極的に原子力の平和利用に活かすことが重要である。IAEAとしてもこのような活動を積極的に広げていくべきであり、我が国としてもそのための貢献は惜しまない。
- ・世界各国の原子力担当閣僚等と積極的に対話をし、原子力の平和利用の重要性を共に認識した。また、リビア訪問中、同国指導者等との間で原子力の平和利用の重要性を確認した。
- ・来年、総合的規制評価サービス(IRRS)を受け入れる。他の加盟国にも受け入れを呼びかける。
- ・IAEAに対し引き続き積極的に貢献することを約束する。

## (2)第50回IAEA総会特別イベント結果概要

(a)テーマ:「21世紀における原子力の利用についての新たな枠組み;  
供給保証と不拡散」

(b)日程:9月19日(火)～21日(木)

(c)出席者:

61カ国から政府、研究機関、原子力産業界等関係者約300人が議論に参加した。我が国より、パネリスト及びスピーカーとして近藤原子力委員長及び服部日本原子力産業協会副会長が参加した。

(d)会合の結果と今後の予定

- ・本特別イベントにおいては、核燃料供給保証の在り方に関して、六カ国提案のみならず、我が国やドイツ、ロシアなどから新たに提案が出されるなど、多様な観点から関心国や事業者等幅広いハイレベルの関係者が積極的に見解を出し合うとともに、それぞれのメリット・デメリット、実現可能性、今後の課題等について活発な議論が行われた。(別添3参照)
- ・全体議長は3日間の議論の内容の総括を22日にIAEA総会において報告したが(別添4参照)、総会においては特段の意見は発せられなかった。

今後、理事会(今週)がこれを審議してIAEA事務局に対し今後の取扱いに関して指示を出すことになるが、全体議長の提案が受け入れられれば、来年のIAEA理事会に向けて核燃料供給保証の枠組みの設立について専門家等を交えた検討が深められていくことになる。

### (3) 松田大臣と各国要人との会談(9月18日(月))

#### ① ボドマン米国エネルギー省長官との会談

- ・ 国際原子力エネルギー・パートナーシップ(GNEP)における協力について、今後とも両政府間で協力内容に関する協議を密接に進めていく旨を合意した。
- ・ 我が国より、核燃料供給保証について、日本提案につき関心をもって対応願いたい旨要請した。
- ・ 我が国より、リビアの大量破壊兵器放棄は、核不拡散を進める上で良いモデルになるものであり、米国においても一層リビアとの協力をお願いしたい旨を伝えた。

#### ② エルバラダイ事務局長との会談

- ・ 我が国より、核燃料供給保証について、日本提案につき関心をもって対応願いたい旨要請した。
- ・ 北朝鮮及びイランの核問題に対する懸念を共有した。

#### ③ ビュガ仏国原子力庁長官との会談

- ・ 高速増殖炉「もんじゅ」を利用した、我が国と仏国との間の原子力協力を推進することについて意見の一致をみた。
- ・ 我が国より、核燃料供給保証について、日本提案につき関心をもって対応願いたい旨要請した。

### (4) 町委員と要人との会談(9月19日(火)～20(水))

#### ① マレーシア:ダウド原子力庁長官

- ・ マレーシアで開催予定のFNCA大臣級会合等の開催日程について調整を行った。
- ・ 大臣級会合の討議の議題は「アジアの持続的発展における原子力の役割」と「原子力発電等原子力利用に対する一般国民との相互理解促進」が候補となりうる。今後両国で検討する。
- ・ マレーシアの原子力発電の建設計画については経済企画庁に検討委員会を設置し、本年から検討を開始する。

②インドネシア:スジャルトモ原子力庁長官

- ・インドネシアにおいては、本年1月大統領が2020年以前に原子力発電所を建設することを決めた。
- ・11月初めに予定されているFNCAの原子力広報プロジェクトのセミナーの一部をIAEAの提案を受けて共同で行うことについて意見交換を行った。詳細内容については関係者間で調整を行うこととした。

③ポーランド:ニボニチャンスキー原子力委員長

- ・ポーランドにおいては、原子力発電所の建設計画は1990年に中止された経緯があるが、現在の新政権はエネルギー安全保障の観点から、原子力発電所を建設する方針を明らかにした。
- ・既に原子力発電所の建設計画に関する検討委員会を設置し、2020年頃に新規2基の運転開始を目指す。人材育成と立地点の決定が課題。
- ・高温ガス炉を利用した石炭のガス化についても議論が行われている。

④カザフスタン: ブリリキ エネルギー・鉱物資源副大臣

- ・原子力フロントエンド及び原子力発電についての日本の協力の申出に感謝。濃縮と転換はロシアが実施している。再転換と燃料ペレット製造を自国で行っており、ロシアに輸出している。これらの技術については、長い経験がある。
- ・将来的にはウレンコでの濃縮も考えている。また、濃縮以外の工程も自国で行いたいと考えている。

⑤IAEA: チェト技術協力担当事務次長

(岡村ウィーン国際機関日本政府代表部公使同席)

- ・日本は技術協力資金を20%拠出している一方、それ以外の活動に対する日本の役割がかなり低いことについて意見交換を行った。
- ・この問題を解決するためには、両者が共同して対応する必要があるとの認識を共有した。

以上

**Statement by Mr. MATSUDA Iwao**  
**Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy**  
**at the 50<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the IAEA**  
**18 September, 2006**

***1. Opening Address***

**Mr. President, Mr. Director General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,**

**On behalf of the Government of Japan, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election as President of the 50<sup>th</sup> General Conference. I would also like to welcome the Republic of Malawi, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Mozambique, and the Republic of Palau, who are expected to become members of the IAEA.**

**On this occasion, let me offer my heartfelt congratulations to the IAEA and Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, on being awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.**

**Mr. President,**

**Japan, as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, strongly believes in its mission to appeal to the world for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. As the IAEA will celebrate its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary next year, Japan once again calls upon all countries to demonstrate their firm determination to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons.**

Japan highly values the IAEA's activities and will continue to work closely with the Agency in various areas. Since October last year, the Resident Representative of Japan, Ambassador Amano, has been serving as the Chair of the Board of Governors. I believe this is one way, in which we have made a positive contribution to the effective functioning of the Agency.

This 50<sup>th</sup> General Conference marks the beginning of a series of events commemorating the IAEA's anniversary. I am pleased to announce that, as part of our contribution, Japan will host an IAEA symposium on nuclear energy in April next year. I hope that this symposium will be successful with the participation of a wide range of countries.

## ***2. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the IAEA***

Mr. President,

In recent years, the role of nuclear energy has been re-evaluated and the momentum for the promotion of nuclear energy has grown across the globe. The use of nuclear energy needs to be promoted in a manner that fully takes into account various elements of nuclear non-proliferation, safety and security. From this perspective, the role of the IAEA has become even more important.

Japan has utilized nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, fully ensuring international confidence and maintaining high transparency through faithful implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement for nearly 30 years. As a result, in September 2004, the implementation of integrated safeguards commenced in Japan. Japan is committed to

fully cooperating with the IAEA in strict implementation of safeguards in Japan.

In October last year, Japan announced the “Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”, which lays down our basic viewpoints regarding our nuclear energy policy. Identifying nuclear energy as a key source of electricity, Japan seeks to establish the nuclear fuel cycle, while strictly limiting the use to the peaceful purposes. This policy is articulated in the Framework as Japan’s basic stance. Furthermore, my country will promote research and development on FBR cycle technology which has the advantage in ensuring stable energy supply and reduction in radioactive waste, and we are prepared to share the results with the international community as a contribution on our part.

### ***3. Strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Regime***

Mr. President,

The international community needs to reinforce the NPT regime. Despite our achievements in this regard, such as the progress towards the universalization of the Additional Protocol, the amendment to the NSG Guidelines, and the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification, the NPT regime remains under strain with challenges such as the nuclear issues of the DPRK and Iran. Nuclear proliferation is a threat to international peace and security, and it directly affects the security of all nations. From this standpoint, we need to redouble our efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Various proposals were made aiming at reinforcing the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as the Russian initiative, the six-nation initiative, and the GNEP as a framework of international cooperation including research and development, alongside the MNA proposed by the IAEA Director General.

Japan welcomes these proposals, but bringing them forward is a challenging, yet important task. We need to examine how to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring consistency with non-proliferation requirements. In so doing, Japan believes that due consideration should be given to questions such as whether the right of peaceful uses will not be unduly restricted, and whether additional burden will not be imposed on those countries that fully comply with relevant international rules. Japan will take part in, and contribute to international discussions at the IAEA and other forums in a constructive manner.

The assurance of nuclear fuel supply is indeed the most pressing issue that needs to be addressed. At the June Board of Governors meeting, the six-nation initiative on reliable access to nuclear fuel was brought to the attention of member states. Japan would like to propose the establishment of an "IAEA Standby Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply," with a view to complementing the contents of the six-nation initiative.



**This Standby Arrangements System covers not only uranium enrichment but all phases of the whole front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium ore supply, conversion and fuel fabrication, uranium stock and reserve, so that many countries will be allowed to participate under certain conditions and to make contributions, while reflecting the diversity of participating countries. This will also help prevent and respond to market failure. I hope that this proposal will be our most valuable contribution.**

**With the preparatory process of the 2010 NPT Review Conference due to commence next year, Japan will play its part to secure the smooth launching of the process with a view to ensuring the success of the Review Conference.**

#### ***4. Nuclear Issues of the DPRK and Iran***

**Mr. President,**

**While the nuclear issues of the DPRK and Iran remain as matters of immediate and grave concern, the Libyan decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) provides a good precedent to follow. Last month, I paid a visit to Libya, making the first-ever visit by a Japanese cabinet minister. It is important that the international community makes a positive response to Libya's renunciation of its WMDs. The international community should demonstrate the benefits of a strategic decision to cooperate with the international community and to be a part of the global non-proliferation mainstream. We should do our utmost to extend cooperation to Libya so that Libya can become a role model for others to follow. During my visit to Libya, the**

**Libyan leader and I confirmed our intention to strengthen bilateral relations in the future.**

**Nearly a year has passed since the Six-Party Talks adopted the Joint Statement last year, in which the DPRK has committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes. As is clearly mentioned in the UN Security Council Resolution 1695, we urge the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition and to work towards the expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement. We also urge the DPRK to respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, including early resolution of the abduction issue, as is pointed out in the Chair's Summary of the G8 Summit meeting this year.**

**The multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles last July are closely related to the nuclear issue, given the potential of such systems to be used as a means of WMDs delivery. This act by the DPRK is a matter of grave concern to the security of Japan and to the peace and security of the international community, as well as from the perspective of non-proliferation of WMDs. Furthermore, it is a deplorable act that impedes the efforts by the countries concerned for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Japan is determined to make its utmost effort toward steady implementation of the Resolution 1695 in cooperation with the international community.**

**Turning to the Iranian nuclear issue, it is regrettable that Iran has been continuing uranium enrichment in defiance of the UN Security**

**Council Resolution 1696. The issue is not about whether Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Rather, what is important is that the right can only be exercised on the premise that Iran restore the confidence of the international community that was lost because of its past activities.**

**The Resolution 1696 is not meant to deprive Iran of its right as Iran argues, but it stresses that the right has to be exercised in accordance with internationally-established rules and with confidence of the international community. Japan supports the “comprehensive proposals” presented by the EU3, China, Russia and the United States, which also underline this point. Japan strongly urges Iran to accept the Resolution, immediately suspend uranium enrichment-related activities and return to the negotiation table. Japan believes it is the best option that will benefit all parties concerned. Japan will work for a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue in concert with the international community.**

### ***5. Nuclear Terrorism***

**Mr. President,**

**It is imperative that the international community collectively address the issue of nuclear security in order to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. From this viewpoint, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism which Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi signed last September at the United Nations, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material adopted at the Diplomatic Conference in July last**

year, are a testament to the international community's firm union against nuclear terrorism.

Japan has been conducting intensive consultations domestically for the early conclusion of these instruments in order to facilitate their early entry into force. In this regard, Japan will host an IAEA seminar on nuclear security, including the issue of smooth implementation of these conventions, in Tokyo this November, with the participation of Asian countries.

Japan welcomes the U.S.-Russian Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced by U.S. President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 15 July in St. Petersburg, which, we believe, will help strengthen measures against nuclear terrorism.

#### ***6. International Cooperation for the Promotion of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy***

Mr. President,

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including radioactive sources, are extremely beneficial for the socio-economic development of the international society. The role of the IAEA in this area is of great importance.

Japan attaches significance to IAEA technical cooperation activities. Japan has been making a considerable contribution to the RCA (Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training) and also is one of the few Member States that have

continuously contributed 100% of its share to the Technical Cooperation Fund amid its tight budgetary situations. We strongly encourage all Member States to pay their share of the Fund in full and without delay. We also urge recipient countries to fulfill their shared responsibilities.

The Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), in which Japan plays a leading role, is a framework that has promoted peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Asia, encouraging voluntary cooperation among participating countries. A similar kind regional forum could be beneficial to achieving the same objective in other regions such as Africa. Japan would like to extend its support through the IAEA framework, and to work toward strengthening such regional forums.

As a country that leads the world in science and technology, Japan believes it important to apply innovative technologies to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan also believes that the IAEA should expand its activities to engage more in such fields. I assure you that Japan will spare no efforts in supporting the Agency in this respect.

In recent times, I have had various opportunities to meet with Ministers in charge of nuclear energy policy from countries around the world, such as Bangladesh, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and the United States. We have all confirmed the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a view to securing stable supply of energy as well as preventing global warming.

Last month, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Kazakhstan and met with President Nazarbaev, with the two leaders confirming their intention to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For my part, during my visit to Libya, I also confirmed the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the Libyan leader and ministers concerned.

### ***7. Nuclear Safety***

Mr. President,

To promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ensuring safety is the fundamental precondition. In particular, it is useful to conduct policy dialogue and a peer review among high-level officials of regulatory authorities of the countries with advanced nuclear safety regulations. In this connection, Japan is planning to receive the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) next year in cooperation with relevant countries. Taking into consideration the usefulness of the Review Service, Japan would like to encourage Member States to receive the IRRS in order to enhance nuclear safety.

### ***8. Transport of Radioactive Material***

Mr. President,

The safe transport of radioactive material is essential for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the basis of the right of freedom of navigation under the international law, Japan has conducted such transport, while employing the most stringent safety measures in accordance with the international standards set by the relevant

international organizations. At the same time, Japan is willing to maintain dialogue between shipping and coastal states, aimed at improving mutual understanding and building confidence.

Furthermore, a Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission was conducted in Japan last year. Japan finds the mission profoundly useful in that the objective appraisal by the IAEA verified the effectiveness of Japan's regulatory practices in the safe transport of radioactive materials. Japan is highly appreciative of the smooth conduct of the mission and will commit itself to the further enhancement of safety.

#### ***9. IAEA Budget***

Mr. President,

There is no doubt that sufficient financial resources are necessary for the IAEA to play its expected role. In preparing the 2008-2009 Programme and Budget Proposals, however, Japan would like to request the Secretariat to pay due consideration to the budgetary situation of Member States and to continue its efforts toward improving efficiency in budget management through prioritization of projects and reduction of costs.

#### ***10. Closing Remarks***

Mr. President,

With the mounting challenges to peace and security today, the IAEA's vital role can only grow. I assure you of Japan's continued support to the IAEA.

**Thank you for your attention.**



国際原子力機関第50回総会  
松田岩夫政府代表（内閣府特命担当大臣（科学技術政策））演説  
（仮訳）

1. 序

議長、事務局長、ご列席の皆様、

日本政府を代表して、議長閣下が国際原子力機関第50回通常総会の議長に選出されたことを心からお祝い申し上げます。また、マラウィ、モンテネグロ、モザンビーク、パラオが近く加盟する運びとなったことを歓迎します。

また、昨年、エルバラダイ事務局長及びIAEAがノーベル平和賞を受賞したことに心から祝意を表します。

議長、

我が国は、唯一の被爆国として、世界に核廃絶を訴えていく使命があると考えます。来年のIAEA設立50周年を前に、すべての国に対し核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を実現するために決意を確固たるものとするよう改めて訴えます。

我が国は、IAEAのこれまでの活動を高く評価しており、今後とも我が国として種々の分野で協力していく考えです。この一年間、天野在ウィーン日本国政府代表部大使がIAEA理事会議長を務めました。これはIAEAの運営に対する我が国の貢献の一例だと考えます。

今回の総会を皮切りに、今後、IAEA設立50周年を記念する様々なイベントが開催されると承知しております。我が国の貢献の一環として、来年4月、我が国において、原子力エネルギーに関するシンポジウムをIAEAと開催する予定ですが、私は、このシンポジウムが、幅広い国々の参加により成功することを願っています。

2. 原子力の平和的利用とIAEA

議長、

近年、原子力エネルギーの果たす役割が改めて見直され、国際的に原子力の平和的利用推進の気運が高まっています。原子力エネルギーの利用は、核不拡散、安全、セキュリティに十分配慮して推進することが求められていることから、IAEAの果たす役割はますます重要となってきています。

我が国は、30年近くにわたりIAEA保障措置協定を誠実に履行し、高い透明性を持って国際社会の信頼を得つつ、原子力の平和的利用を推進してきました。その結果、2004年9月より統合保障措置が実施されています。我が国は引き続き保障措置の厳格な実施に最大限協力を行いたいと考えます。

また、昨年10月には我が国の原子力政策の基本的考え方を示した「原子力政策大綱」を策定しました。我が国は、原子力政策大綱に明記したとおり、原子力の利用を平和目的に限定するとともに、原子力発電を基幹電源としつつ、核燃料サイクルの確立を図ることを基本としています。また、我が国は、エネルギー安定供給や放射性廃棄物の低減の点で利点のある高速増殖炉サイクル技術の研究開発を進め、成果を内外に発信し国際的に貢献します。

### 3. 核不拡散体制の強化

議長、

国際社会としてNPT体制を強化する必要があります。追加議定書の普遍化、NSGガイドラインの改正、保障措置・検証諮問委員会の設置など進展が見られた分野もありますが、国際的な核不拡散体制は、北朝鮮やイランの核問題などに見られるよう引き続き深刻な状況にあります。核の拡散は、国際の平和と安全に対する脅威であり、各国の安全保障に直結する問題です。この観点から、我々は、核不拡散体制の強化のための努力を倍加する必要があります。

現在の核不拡散体制を強化するため、エルバラダイ事務局長が提唱した原子力の多国間管理(MNA)の構想を始めとして、ロシアの国際センター、燃料供給保証に関する六ヶ国構想、更には研究開発を含めた国際協力としてのGNEPなど、様々な提案がなされています。

我が国はこれらの提案を歓迎します。これらを前進させることは容易ではありませんが、重要な課題です。我々は、不拡散との整合性を確保しながら、如何に原子力の平和的利用を進めていくかについて検討する必要があります。その際、原子力の平和的利用の権利が必要以上に制限されないよう、また、国際規則を誠実に遵守している国に新たな負担を負わせることのないよう十分に配慮すべきと考えます。我が国は、この問題に関し今後IAEAを中心に行われる国際的な議論に建設的に参加し、貢献していく考えです。

直近の課題は、核燃料供給保証の問題です。六ヶ国からの提案による核燃料供給保証構想について、本年6月のIAEA理事会で紹介がなされました。我が国は同構想を補完するものとして、「核燃料供給登録システム」の構築を提案いたします。このシステムは、参加国の多様な実態を反映しつつ、多くの国が一定条件の下に参加・貢献できるよう、ウラン濃縮に限らずウラン原料、転換・燃料加工、ウラン在庫・備蓄等フロントエンド全体をカバーするものです。これは、また、市場擾乱を予防したり、そのような市場擾乱に対応する一助となります。私は、この提案が我々としての最も有益な貢献となることを期待しています。

来年から2010年NPT運用検討会議に向けた準備プロセスが始まりますが、我が国は、同運用検討会議の成功に向け、この準備プロセスの円滑な立ち上がりに積極的に貢献していきます。

#### 4. 北朝鮮及びイランの核問題

議長、

直近の懸念すべき問題として、北朝鮮及びイランの核問題がありますが、一方で、大量破壊兵器開発計画の廃棄を決断したリビアの例は、国際社会の平和と安定に貢献する先例として高く評価されます。先月、私は我が国の閣僚として初めてリビアを訪問しました。リビアの大量破壊兵器の放棄に対し国際社会が前向きな対応をすることは重要であり、国際社会は、国際社会と協力し、グローバルな不拡散の主流の一部になるとの戦略的決定がもたらす利益を示すべきです。我々は、他国が見習うことのできるモデルとなれるよう、リビアに対し出来る限りの協力を行うべきです。私は率先してリビアの指導者との間で今後の二国間関係の強化を確認したところです。

北朝鮮の核問題の解決のための六者会合が、北朝鮮によるすべての核兵器及び既存の核計画の放棄等を謳った共同声明を採択してから、早一年が経とうとしています。国連安保理決議1695でも明記されているとおり、北朝鮮が早期かつ無条件で六者会合に復帰すること及び共同声明の履行に着手することを強く求めます。また、G8サミット議長総括でも指摘されているとおり、北朝鮮が拉致問題の早急な解決を含め、国際社会の他の安全保障及び人道上の懸念に対応するよう求めます。

7月の北朝鮮による弾道ミサイルの発射は、その大量破壊兵器の運搬手段としての役割を考えれば、核問題と切り離して考えることはできません。これは、我が国の安全保障や国際社会の平和と安定、更には大量破壊兵器の不拡散という観点から重大な問題であるばかりか、六者会合の再開に向けた関係国の努力を損なう遺憾な行爲です。我が国としては、国際社会と連携しつつ、安保理決議1695の着実な実施に向けて最善を尽くす考えです。

イランの核問題については、イランが安保理決議1696に従わず、ウラン濃縮を継続していることは遺憾です。イランが原子力の平和的利用の権利を有していることに疑いはありませんが、重要なのは、その権利の行使はイランの過去の行爲により失われた国際社会の信頼が回復されることが大前提となるということです。同決議は、イラン政府が主張しているようにイランのNPT上の権利を剥奪することを目指しているのではなく、国際社会の信頼を回復した

上で権利が行使されるべきことを明確にしたものです。この点は、E U 3 と米・露・中の 6 ヶ国が提示した「包括的提案」にも明記されており、我が国はこの「包括的提案」を支持しています。イランがこの決議を受け入れ、ウラン濃縮関連活動を直ちに停止した上で、交渉のテーブルに戻ることを強く求めます。これが双方に利益となる最善の選択肢と信じます。我が国は、問題の平和的・外交的解決に向けて引き続き国際社会と一致して行動していく考えです。

#### 5. 核テロ対策

議長、

核テロリズムの脅威に対抗するためには、国際社会が団結して核セキュリティ問題に取り組むことが不可欠です。この観点から、小泉総理が昨年 9 月の国連総会の際に署名した核テロリズム防止条約及び昨年 7 月の外交会議で採択された改正核物質防護条約は、核テロ対策の強化に向けた国際社会の断固たる姿勢の証として極めて有意義です。

両条約の早期発効に向け、我が国としても早期の締結に向けた国内の検討を進めているところです。また、我が国は、両条約の円滑な実施の促進を含む主にアジア地域を対象とした核セキュリティに関する I A E A のセミナーを本年 11 月に東京においてホストする予定です。

本年 7 月 15 日にサンクト・ペテルブルグで米露首脳より発表された「核テロリズムに対抗するためのグローバル・イニシアチブ」は、核テロ対策の強化に資するものと理解しており、我が国はこれを歓迎します。

#### 6. 原子力の平和的利用推進のための国際協力

議長、

放射線を含めた原子力の平和的利用は、国際社会の経済的・社会的発展にとって極めて有益であることは言うまでもありません。この分野における I A E A の役割には大きなものがあります。

I A E A における技術協力については、我が国は、その重要性に鑑み、原子力科学技術に関する地域協力協定 (R C A) に対して積極的貢献を行うとともに、厳しい財政状況の中、技術協力基金の拠出金を 100% 支払ってきている数少ない国の一つであります。すべての加盟国に対し、技術協力基金への拠出を遅滞なく完全に行うよう強く求めます。同時に、被援助国側も相応の責任を果たすことを改めて求めます。

我が国が主導するアジア原子力協力フォーラム（F N C A）は、アジア各国の自発的な協力を促し、アジア地域における原子力の平和的利用に大きな役割を果たしています。同様の地域的なフォーラムは、アフリカなど他の地域の原子力の平和的利用の推進にも有効であると考えられます。我が国としては、I A E Aの枠組みを通じた支援を積極的に行うとともに、このような地域フォーラムの強化に積極的に協力していきたいと考えます。

我が国は、科学技術の先進国として、技術革新の成果を積極的に原子力の平和的利用に活かすことが重要であると考えます。I A E Aとしても、このような活動を積極的に広げていくべきであり、我が国としてもそのための貢献は惜しまないことをはっきり申し上げます。

私は、最近バングラデシュ、中国、マレーシア、フィリピン、韓国、ベトナム、米国等、世界各国の原子力担当閣僚等と積極的に対話を行い、エネルギーの安定供給及び地球温暖化対策の観点から、原子力の平和的利用の重要性を共に認識しました。

また、先月、小泉総理はカザフスタンを訪問し、ナザルバエフ大統領と会談しましたが、その際、両指導者は原子力の平和的利用の分野での2国間関係強化の意思を相互に確認しました。

私自身も、リビア訪問中、同国指導者及び関係閣僚との間で原子力の平和的利用の重要性を確認したところです。

## **7. 原子力安全**

議長、

原子力の平和的利用を推進するためには、安全確保が大前提です。特に、原子力安全規制に関する先進的な取組を行っている各国規制機関のハイレベルでの国際的な政策対話及び相互評価を行っていくことは有益であると考えます。この点に関し、我が国は、来年、各国の協力を得て、総合的規制評価サービス（I R R S）を受け入れたいと考えています。その有効性を踏まえて、加盟国においても、原子力安全の高度化を進めるべく、I R R Sを受け入れていくことをここに呼びかけます。

## **8. 放射性物質の輸送**

議長、

原子力の平和的利用のためには、放射性物質の安全な輸送が不可欠です。我が国は、「航行の自由」の原則の下、国際基準に従って、最大限慎重な措置を講じており、輸送国と沿岸国との信頼醸成のための対話も積極的に継続していきます。

さらに、昨年、我が国は、輸送安全評価サービス（T r a n S A S）ミッションを受けました。I A E Aによる客観的な評価により

我が国の放射性物質の輸送安全施策の有効性が検証されたことは大変有意義であったと理解しています。このミッションが円滑に実施されたことに感謝するとともに、更なる安全性の向上に努めていきます。

#### 9. IAEA予算

議長、

IAEAがその期待される役割を果たすためには、十分な財政的裏付けが必要です。事務局において2008-2009年計画予算原案を作成中であると承知していますが、抛出国の財政状況に然るべき考慮が払われることも重要です。事業の優先順位設定と経費削減による予算の一層効率的な運用を図るよう、引き続き事務局の努力を求めます。

#### 10. 結語

議長、

このように平和と安全に関する課題が山積する中で、IAEAの重要性はますます高まっています。我が国としてもIAEAに対し引き続き積極的に貢献していくことを約束し、演説を終わります。

御清聴有難うございました。

(了)

## Information Circular

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# Communication received on 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Agency concerning arrangements for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply

### Summary

The Secretariat has received on 12 September 2006 a communication from the Permanent Mission of Japan attaching a document entitled "Japan's Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply".

As requested by the Permanent Mission, the text of the attachment is herewith reproduced for the information of Member States.

## **Japan's Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply<sup>1</sup>**

September 1, 2006

### **1. Introduction**

Japan supports the objective put forward in the "Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel" proposed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States in relation to international discussions on assured access to nuclear fuels. However, bearing in mind the concerns and questions expressed by the Board Members of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in June 2006, Japan feels it useful to make a proposal complementary to the above-mentioned six-nation proposal.

In this consideration, we deem it proper;

- To take care of not only uranium enrichment service but also all important activities of the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication as market failure might occur at various junctures;
- To focus not only on remedial responses to market failure for uranium fuel supply, but also on the prevention of the occurrence of such failure by reporting to the IAEA up-to-date information about the market, that is, each State's capacity in various activities related to fuel supply to nuclear power generation, so as to improve the transparency of the market and to alert the degradation of its adequacy if it is recognized.

### **2. Proposal**

We propose to establish a system called as the "IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply" under the auspices of the IAEA, which incorporates both an information system to contribute to the prevention of the occurrence of market failure and the backup feature for supply assurance proposed in the six-nation proposal.

The working principles of the system are as follows;

- (1) Member States voluntarily notify the IAEA as the depository organization, of their intentions to participate in the system by registering their nuclear fuel supply capacity in terms of current stock and supply capacity in the following areas;
  - uranium ore supply capacity
  - uranium reserve supply capacity, including recovered uranium
  - uranium conversion capacity
  - uranium enrichment capacity
  - fuel fabrication capacity.

Any member State is eligible to participate in the system, provided that the IAEA Board of Governors finds no non-compliance of the IAEA safeguards agreement by that State.

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<sup>1</sup> To be circulated at the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> IAEA General Conference Special Event, "New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Assurance of Supply and Nonproliferation", 19-21 September 2006.



- (2) A participating State periodically (annually) notifies the level of availability of such capacity at the following three levels:

Level 1: It has already started commercial activities and is providing products/services domestically, but not providing products/services to foreign countries on a commercial basis. Therefore although it has the willingness to cooperate the emergency request to supply, the quantity may be limited and considerable time might be required to start the supply.

Level 2: It has already started exporting products/services to foreign countries on commercial basis. Therefore in case of receiving the emergency request to supply, it has the willingness to do so as soon as possible within the range of available capacities.

Level 3: It has reserves that can be exported at a short-term notice.

- (3) The IAEA is expected to play the following roles:

- a) to conclude bilateral "standby arrangements" with respective participating States by receiving Letters Of Intent and to administer the overall system;
- b) to administer, as the depository, the data-base utilizing information periodically provided by participating States on their commitment areas as well as levels of availability and information routinely gathered by the Agency such as potential demands for the system, e.g. programs of future nuclear power generation in member States and the situation of the international uranium market. To prepare an annual report on the situation (adequacy) of world nuclear fuel supply market based on the data-base will be one of the ways to contribute to the improvement of the transparency of the market.
- c) to play an intermediary function should actual disruption of fuel supply occur in a State.

A State is eligible for enjoying the function of the system if the State has satisfied an international nonproliferation norm, which the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting should adopt after careful consideration at the start of the system.

This system is a virtual arrangement: as participating States are supposed to continue to possess and control nuclear fuel supply capacity, the IAEA does not need to actually possess or store them.

### 3. Discussion

- (1) The proposed system covers not only uranium enrichment service but also all important activities of the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium storage, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication, taking into consideration the concern of some countries that market failure might occur at various junctures. Furthermore the system is intended to prevent the occurrence of the market failure in the first place by asking the IAEA to gather data and information about each State's supply capacity, analyze them and report the market situation from the viewpoint of the susceptibility to the market failure. Therefore it can be said that these functions are complementary to the six-nation proposal.
- (2) Whereas the six-nation proposal is based upon a dichotomy between supplier States and recipient States, a country like Japan, which is producing enriched uranium for domestic uses but not exporting it currently, though planning to export it in the future, cannot be categorized under the dichotomy. As establishing a system for supply assurance is an expression of the will of the

international community to prevent the occurrence of isolation of a member state from the international nuclear fuel supply market, it is desirable to make it possible for as many States as practicable to participate in and contribute to the system on a voluntary basis based on their diverse state of the capacity and situation as proposed in this paper.

- (3) It is clear that the success of the proposed system will depend on the cooperation of the industries. Although it is known that the last thing the industries want to cooperate is something that would interfere in the market, it is hoped that the industries will find a win-win situation in the cooperation to the system we propose as the establishment of it should be useful for the sound expansion of the nuclear power production and nuclear fuel supply business, in particular.
- (4) The introduction of the proposed system will not pose any new international obligation to member States other than the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation to be used as the condition for eligibility. The norm, we expect, should be a universal one any members should observe. What we do expect by the introduction of the system is the effectiveness of such an arrangement in encouraging States to enjoy the benefit of economy in terms of fuel cost and the start-up costs as well as reliability provided by a diverse well-functioning market for uranium and fuel supply services and thus reduce the incentive to develop uncompetitive, small-scale enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities within their national borders.

第50回 IAEA総会特別イベント「21世紀における原子力  
エネルギー利用の新しい枠組み：供給保証と不拡散」の結果概要

9月19日(火)

**オープニング・セッション**

エルバラダイ IAEA事務局長が、原子力は「恩恵は最大、リスクは最小」に利用を進めることが大事、機微技術に係る核拡散リスクに対してはこれらに係る施設を多国間管理し、安定な燃料供給を保証していくことが合理的。早急に検討すべきは、いざという時に政治的影響を受けずに供給を保証できる最後の手段の整備。これらの検討においては供給国と被供給国を二分することなく、両者が相互に助け合うことが重要。本特別イベントでは今後のこの検討のためのロードマップの作成を期待という趣旨の開会挨拶を述べた。ついで、米、露、EU、南ア等の大臣、民間企業やNGOの代表者により核燃料供給保証の在り方に関する見解を披瀝する基調講演が行われた。

なお、基調講演の最後に、近藤原子力委員長が会場から、日本は市場の透明性の向上策を含む日本提案を用意しており、その説明資料を会場配布した旨説明した。

**セッション1**

これまでに提出された核燃料供給保証に係る各提案について、関係者等からそのポイントや考え方が説明され、会場から解決すべき課題の指摘等が様々になされた。

9月20日(水)

**セッション2A(9:30-12:30)**

設立が提案されている核燃料供給保証の枠組みに対して、核燃料生産者、核燃料製造業者等の産業界、原子力発電途上国等から必要性和有効性、実現性についての評価等が述べられた。

**セッション2B(15:00-18:00)**

設立が提案されている核燃料供給保証の枠組みに対して、核燃料製造業者、IAEA法律顧問、国際法学者、システム分析の専門家等から技術的、制度的課題についての分析等が述べられた。

9月21日(木)

**セッション3(10:00-13:00)**

近藤原子力委員長を含む8人のパネリストから、これまでの各セッションの議論を踏まえて将来の方向性に関する見解等が示された。近藤原子力委員長は、核燃料供給保証構想に関する「3つの重要な不確定要因」について、日本提案のもつ補完機能について説明しつつ、所見を述べた。

最後にカーティス議長による会合全体の総括が概要以下のとおりなされ、翌日のIAEA総会に報告された。

- (1) 核燃料供給保証の枠組みは、より広範で長期的に構築していくこととなる多国間枠組みの第一段階と見ることができ、段階的に検討を進めていくべき。
- (2) 検討を更に進めるため、①短期的段階として、核燃料供給保証の枠組みの創設に

焦点を当て、既存提案や日本等の新規提案等を含め、提案内容の精査を行う、②中・長期的段階として、広範囲な多国間システムに展開していくことの可能性に焦点を当て、原子炉機器・技術へのアクセス保証や各国の濃縮・再処理施設の多国間管理への移行など、幅広い可能性を検討することが重要。

(3) 今後、更に検討すべき課題は次のとおり。

①供給保証枠組みの必要性、②保証対象、③保証枠組みの形態、④保証を受けることのできる要件、⑤ I A E A の役割、⑥原子力産業の役割、⑦その他の重要課題

(4) I A E A 理事会が検討すべき構想を取り纏めるには、上述の課題について専門家の詳細な検討が必要。来年の I A E A 理事会において構想の検討が行えるように、この作業の実施を I A E A 事務局に求めるべき。

SPECIAL EVENT AT THE 50<sup>th</sup> IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE*New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century:**Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation*

Vienna: 19 – 21 September 2006

**REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL EVENT, MR. CHARLES CURTIS****Overview**

At the outset of the 21st century, a discussion is taking place concerning the challenge of meeting increasing global energy demands through a possible expansion of the use of nuclear energy, while at the same time minimizing the proliferation risks created by the further spread of sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. A number of useful suggestions have recently been put forward regarding new approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which aim to establish an assured supply of nuclear fuel, as a back-up measure to the commercial market, in certain situations. In general, these proposals are seen to be mutually compatible with, and supportive of, each other.

These recent proposals for assuring supplies of uranium-based nuclear fuel can be seen as one stage in a broader, longer-term development of a multilateral framework that could encompass assurance of supply mechanisms for both natural and low enriched uranium and nuclear fuel, as well as spent fuel management.

Establishing a fully-developed, multilateral framework that is equitable and accessible to all users of nuclear energy, acting in accordance with agreed nuclear non-proliferation norms, will be a complex endeavour that would likely require a progressively phased approach. In general, it is the sense of the Event Chairman that the following could be a possible way forward:

1. a first – near term – phase focusing on establishing mechanisms for assurances of supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants. Included for examination in the near term phase would be the proposal for an IAEA-owned low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank advanced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the proposal of the six major nuclear fuel supplier States (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and the proposal of the Russian Federation for international nuclear fuel cycle centres. This near term phase examination should also include the proposals of Japan and the United Kingdom, described as “complementary” to the six major fuel-supplier State initiative, and the proposal of the German Foreign Minister (still under development), as well as any other such proposals that might be elaborated in the near term.
2. a second – mid and long term – phase, focusing on the possibilities of evolving a truly comprehensive multilateral system, integrated with commercial market mechanisms and designed to assure supply adequacy and responsible management and disposition of waste. Included for examination in the mid and longer term phase would be proposals for assured access to power reactor components and technologies and the possibilities for developing future enrichment and reprocessing operations on a multilateral basis and ultimately converting existing enrichment and reprocessing facilities from exclusively national to multinational operations.

The evolution of a fuel assurance framework, in the first phase, would likely entail a step-by-step approach, requiring the IAEA Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, industry and other expert parties, to present proposals to the IAEA Board of Governors, through the Director General, as they mature and as policy, technical and legal issues are worked out.

### **IAEA Special Event**

To facilitate IAEA Member State discussion of recent proposals on assurance of supply mechanisms, with a view to formulating well-structured recommendations regarding the establishment of assurance of supply mechanisms for the consideration of the Board of Governors in 2007, and focusing in the first phase on assurances of supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants, the Director General organized a Special Event entitled "New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Assurances of Supply and Non-Proliferation" during the 50th regular session of the IAEA General Conference, from 19 to 21 September 2006 in Vienna. More than 300 participants from 61 Member States and various industry and other organizations took part in the discussions.

The discussions at the Special Event indicated that, in order to move forward, a number of policy, legal and technical issues remain to be addressed in greater detail. It was not the purpose of the Special Event to judge or rank the feasibility of the current proposals put forward by the Director General, States and non-governmental organizations. Instead, the objective was to constructively identify the possible strengths, weaknesses and opportunities presented, taking advantage of the full range of perspectives represented by the Event attendees.

### **A Way Forward**

May I say from the outset that through the discussions that took place during the Event, great care was taken by all participants to make clear that assurance of supply mechanisms are not intended to alter the right of any State to take its own decision regarding fuel cycle choices. I should also note that a number of participants expressed concerns about implied or intended conditions as may be applied to fuel assurance mechanisms. Finally, I should also add here that the ideas that were generated by those discussions constitute the views of the Event participants. From the discussions during the event, I believe the following issues would benefit from further elaboration.

#### *Why is an assurance of supply mechanism needed?*

Proponents of the establishment of an international back-up mechanism for assured supply of nuclear power reactor fuel assert that it would have a dual-objective, i.e. to address: (a) the possible consequences of interruptions of supply of nuclear fuel due to political considerations that might dissuade countries from initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes; and (b) the vulnerabilities that create incentives for building new national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Thus, an assurance of supply mechanism would be envisaged solely as a back-up measure to the operation of the commercial market, for those States that want to make use of it, in order to assure supply in instances of interruption for political reasons. It would neither be a substitute for the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels, nor would it deal with disruption of supply due to commercial, technical or other non-political reasons. While an assurance of supply mechanism would be designed to give supply assurance to States that voluntarily choose to rely on international fuel supply, rather than build their own indigenous fuel cycle capabilities, a State availing itself of such a mechanism would not be required to forfeit, or in any way abridge, its rights under Article IV of the NPT, in connection with peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The path forward would benefit from a clear consensus judgment of the proliferation risks associated with increased diversification of enrichment and other fuel cycle capacities. Correspondingly, Board of

Governors consideration would benefit from clarification, by each of the proposal sponsors, concerning any explicit or implicit conditionality applicable to eligible beneficiaries of the supply assurance mechanism.

*What is to be assured?*

From the discussions, it was clear that existing proposals dealt with assurances of supply in different but complementary ways. Some of the proposals focused on assuring supplies of natural uranium and low enriched uranium stocks, and still others focused on assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel itself, through the establishment of a series of interlocking arrangements among major suppliers. Furthermore, it was asserted that there was also a complementary need for greater transparency in uranium markets, and that assured access to a broader range of nuclear reactor technology would be important to operators and countries seeking to reduce the risk of interruptions on political grounds.

It was clear that a fully developed assurance of supply mechanism would comprise several of the ideas advanced which, taken as a whole, are considered mutually supportive and consistent. It is equally clear that this evaluation would need to be phased in over time.

*What are the modalities of assurance mechanisms?*

The discussions showed that the modalities of possible fuel assurance mechanisms would also need to be assessed. The possible modalities could include: 1) a virtual reserve<sup>1</sup> of natural and low enriched uranium, based on binding contractual agreements for the supply of such material, plus parallel binding commitments/assurances of fuel fabrication services. It was recognized that while an actual (physical) bank of natural or low enriched uranium could be established, it would be impractical for technical and economic reasons to have an actual bank of nuclear fuel assemblies, given the different types of reactor designs and the many variants of nuclear fuel required for them – in this case, the physical bank of nuclear material would need to be supplemented by parallel binding commitments/assurances of fuel fabrication services. It was recognized that the complexity and details of such modalities requires further consideration.

*What objective criteria would be required?*

The discussions also touched upon the issue of objective criteria, i.e. the conditions governing eligibility for benefiting from assurance mechanisms. Different eligibility criteria have been included in the proposals discussed. Further discussion is required regarding the nature of the non-proliferation undertaking to be considered as the qualifying criterion. It was recognized that in accordance with the IAEA Statute, an Agency-administered assurance mechanism would have to be available to all Member States in a non-discriminatory manner. For any mechanism, whether or not it involves a role for the Agency, certain release criteria would need to be defined and agreed upon, either by the IAEA Board of Governors or the supply consortium. Another aspect requiring further assessment is how best to assure that the application of the release mechanism is demonstrably non-political and based on objective criteria.

*Possible role(s) of the Agency?*

Existing proposals envisage different roles for the Agency, and yet others can be considered. The suggested roles ranged from Agency administration or ownership of natural or low enriched uranium stocks, to administration of virtual stocks and associated parallel fuel fabrication commitments. It was noted that the IAEA Statute was sufficiently broad to allow the Agency to establish its own stocks of nuclear fuel,

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<sup>1</sup> A virtual reserve does not involve a separate physical storage of natural or low enriched uranium, but relies on its availability from suppliers that have agreed to be a part of the fuel assurance mechanism.

purchased from, or donated by, Member States for supply to another Member State against charges determined by the Board; to facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel from one Member State to another; and also to facilitate, inter alia, the provision of enrichment and fuel fabrication services by one Member State to another or to the IAEA. It was noted further that a number of legal arrangements were needed, with variations, depending on whether title to the material concerned passes through the Agency or whether it passes directly from the Supplier State to the Recipient State. These were: (1) an arrangement between the Supplier State and the Agency; to include inter alia consent rights by the Supplier State to export the fuel, licensing and transport requirements as well as the corresponding privileges and immunities; (2) an arrangement between the Recipient State and the Agency to include inter alia the issues listed in Article XI.F of the Statute; (3) the underlying contractual arrangements with nuclear fuel providers, transporters, storage providers, etc.; and, (4) in case the IAEA were to establish an actual bank of nuclear fuel, agreements covering safeguards, security, safety and liability for nuclear damage with the State where the fuel is located as well as transit agreements with neighbouring States. While models of certain legal arrangements already exist, the details would need to be worked out.

#### *Possible role(s) of the nuclear industry?*

The discussions involved the participation of representatives of the nuclear industry and showed that different roles for the nuclear industry can be envisaged or have been proposed and that there are many technical and other issues pertaining to nuclear fuel that need further discussion and consideration. It was recognised that for a well-functioning assurance of supply mechanism, whether for nuclear fuel or for reactors, the nuclear industry would be an essential partner. In this regard, further consultations would be useful with the nuclear industry, particularly on a framework under which the nuclear industry would provide the required goods and services in support of an assurance of supply mechanism, without negative effects on the diversity and stability of the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels.

#### *Other key issues*

The discussions also showed that several other important issues concerning assurance mechanisms require further consideration. These include, for instance, issues related to sustainable financing. Other unresolved key issues are how to structure assurance mechanisms in a manner that does not result in a real or perceived division between nuclear fuel/reactor technology haves and have-nots, and does not undermine existing multilateral, treaty-based nuclear non-proliferation norms or State sovereignty/rights.

#### **Next Steps**

Based on the discussions at the Special Event, it is the sense of the Event Chairman that the issues noted above require further detailed expert examination with a view to formulating well-structured recommendations regarding the establishment of assurance of supply mechanisms.

It is also the sense of the Event Chairman that such recommendations could usefully be structured in terms of policy, legal and technical issues, and that proposals could be formulated by the IAEA Secretariat working in parallel with and drawing upon Member States, nuclear industry and other appropriate expertise. This work would naturally take into account current as well as future proposals and other relevant ideas and studies, and this work can and should be undertaken to allow consideration of these matters by the Board of Governors in 2007. It is likely that these undertakings will evolve into an agenda for near- and mid term actions. But it is important to begin.

I trust that these observations will be conveyed, along with any recommendations in this connection by the Director General, to the Agency's Board of Governors.