

長計第六分科会報告書に関するコメント

(財)核物質管理センター

栗原 弘善

本分科会における検討は、原子力に関する国際協力と核不拡散が対象となっている。私は、そのうち、核不拡散に対する問題についてコメントを述べたい。

平和利用の為に原子力開発を推進するに当たっては、安全・安心の確保とともに、核兵器へ転用されることがないように、核不拡散を担保することが必要と言われている。冷戦終了後の現在、5つの核兵器国に加えて、核不拡散条約に加盟していないインド、パキスタンが核実験を行い、事実上の核兵器国と見なされているとともに、イスラエルも核兵器の所有が疑われている。ロシアにおける核兵器解体後の核物質管理の脆弱さから、核密輸の懸念があり、また、イラク、北朝鮮のように、核不拡散条約に加盟している国においても、問題が生じている。

核軍縮は、米露2ヶ国を中心に進んではいるが、必ずしも、一時予想された程の進捗を見せていない。一方、核兵器の政治的、軍事的価値は、これ迄の核兵器国においては減少傾向を示しているものの、紛争地域にある諸国にとっての軍事的価値、地域における覇権を狙う国にとっての政治的意味は、現状よりむしろ増大していると思われる可能性もある。

このような国際情勢の中で、原子力の平和利用、特にリサイクル路線をとっている我が国の平和利用原子力開発路線に対して、我が国内外で、原子力開発の意図に関するパーセプション・ギャップがみられるのは残念なことである。我が国としては、このパーセプション・ギャップを減少させ、平和利用の原子力開発に対する阻害要因となることを防止しなければならない。

その為には、我が国としては、国内の原子力開発利用政策、開発状況についての透明性を向上させることと、国際核不拡散政策の進展に積極的に貢献することの2点を国の方策として採用することが希望される。

具体的な手段については、最近我が国で開催された国際シンポジウム「21世紀の原子力平和利用と核問題」(2000.3.9-10)と「JNC原子力平和利用国際フォーラム」(2000.2.21-22)の中から見出すことができよう。

なお、筆者が上記シンポジウムに提出したパーセプション・ギャップと、その減少策、及びアジアにおける核不拡散問題の進展(信頼醸成措置の促進)に関する個人的見解をまとめたペーパーを添付したい。

**Civil Use of Nuclear Energy and
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
—A Japanese View—**

**Hiroyoshi Kurihara
Senior Executive Director
Nuclear Material Control Center**

Tokyo, Japan

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1. Introduction

It is possible and advisable to promote simultaneously civil use of nuclear energy in one hand and global non-proliferation in the other. Safe and secure utilization of nuclear energy for civil use will be one of the very important options to support increasing energy demand in the 21st Century. When civilian use of nuclear energy has been promoted more than fifty years ago in the world, the center of development was the USA. The wave of peaceful uses of nuclear energy has expanded to other regions of the world, notably to Europe. After declining overwhelming power to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power of the USA in the 1970's, the center of development in the world has shifted to the European region. Construction of nuclear power stations were continued in Europe and European nuclear fuel cycle business has covered not only Europe but other regions of the world, e.g. Asia.

The third wave of nuclear energy development for peaceful uses of nuclear energy appeared in Asia, especially North-east Asia. The major region in the world where nuclear energy is expected to be increased is Asia. Further, we believe that expanding nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be accompanied with strengthening non-proliferation efforts as well as nuclear disarmament movement. Japan, as one of the advanced nations who developed nuclear energy significantly, should increase its efforts to strengthen global and regional non-proliferation efforts.

There is a perception gap between general opinion of Japanese public and that of international community in connection with the possibility/desirability of Japan as a nuclear weapon state. Japanese general public normally do not consider that such possibility exists, but some sector in foreign countries is not persuaded so easily to the argument saying that Japan will not produce or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan in any considerable situations.

In this paper the author introduces the discussions on this perception gap, the ways to decrease such perception gap, and finally his personal proposals to enhance regional confidence on the nuclear energy development in Asian region.

2. Perception gap between Japanese general public and international community

The perception, which considers that Japan is not abandon its intention to possess nuclear weapons if the situation is drastically changed, is accepted in very different way by Japanese general public and by some sectors of international community.

The reasons that Japanese general public presents are the following:

- (1) Japan abandoned any war and is pursuing peaceful way only. This is proven by

its Constitution, Atomic Energy Basic Law and the Government policy of non-nuclear three principles;

- (2) Japan ratified the NPT, also Japan concluded bilateral Governmental nuclear cooperation agreements with supplier states, e.g. USA. By these international commitments Japan will not use nuclear material for military purposes. Japan is accepting IAEA safeguards for all nuclear materials within its territory;
- (3) Having experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan recognized extreme dreadful power of nuclear weapons;
- (4) Since power of mass-media in Japan is so strong and penetrating, if Japanese Government intends to introduce nuclear weapons such intention will be disclosed soon. In other words, confidentiality can not be kept;
- (5) Once it is disclosed to the foreign countries that Japan is producing nuclear weapons, Japan must expect sanctions from other countries. Japan is a nation relying on international trade, therefore, such sanctions would be disastrous to Japan;
- (6) Japan is now under the nuclear umbrella of the USA based upon Japan-US Mutual Security Agreement. Japan does not need to have nuclear weapons;
- (7) Contrarily to the Cold-War era, Japan has no security threat from surrounding nuclear weapon states under present international political situation.

The reasons of some sectors in the international community are the following:

- (1) Once upon a time Japan was a significant military power. After the World War II Japan became a major economic power in the world. If Japan intends to become a hegemony state in the world, Japan may consider possession of nuclear weapons (political weapon) ;
- (2) Japan is surrounded by nuclear weapons states. If Japan wants to be the regional hegemony state in Asia, Japan would require nuclear weapons, since China, which would be a competitor in the region, has already nuclear weapons (political weapon) ;
- (3) DPRK is suspected as a state already developing nuclear weapons. If DPRK is proven to be a nuclear weapon state, or integrated Korea in future has nuclear

weapons or its capability, Japan would consider the necessity of possession of nuclear weapons;

- (4) Japan is already equipped necessary resources for nuclear weapons, including raw materials for nuclear warheads (Pu, HEU), capability to produce such materials (reprocessing, enrichment) and transport measures (rocket technology). Weaponization technology would not be an obstacle for Japan, since Japan has very high technical capability;
- (5) Domestic laws, regulations and policies, e.g. Constitution, non-nuclear principles, will not be the effective barriers when state's intention has changed, Amendments to such laws and regulations are possible;
- (6) It is certain that Japan is a democratic country and has high transparency. However, the intention to go nuclear should be a national top secret matter. It is not clear the power of mass-media can penetrate into such national top secret matter;
- (7) The experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was 50 years ago. The alternation of generation has been experienced. It is not sure such strong non-nuclear will, which was shown immediately after of the disaster, continue to the present generations;

3. Several ways to reduce the perception gap

The author considers the following measures could be useful to reduce the perception gap recognized between Japanese general public and the international community;

- (1) further upgrading of communications between Japan and the international community on the subject;
- (2) further upgrading of transparency in Japan;
- (3) further strengthening of Japanese contribution to the international non-proliferation/nuclear disarmament measures; and
- (4) decreasing the political and military importance of nuclear weapons.

The following measures could be useful for upgrading transparency on the nuclear energy development in Japan;

- (1) More broader release of information related to the decision making on nuclear policy, nuclear energy development, and information given to the IAEA with regards to the detailed nuclear material accountancy/safeguards,
- (2) Involvement of the third party to the process of policy determination by the Government and industries, and
- (3) Multinationalization of private industries.

4. Personal proposals to enhance regional confidence on the nuclear energy development in Asia.

Japan should consider to promote more stronger confidence building measures in Asia. These measures will contribute strengthening of regional non-proliferation regime. There will be many measures aiming for such objective, but the author proposes the following ideas as his personal proposal;

- (1) to enhance regional discussions and communications of the subjects of nuclear related matters as a regular basis in ASEAN Regional Forum, and to seek a possibility of establishing a small core organization to deal with those matters;
- (2) Information exchange and joint implementation of research and developmental activity on the nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) system by Asian countries,
- (3) The Establishment of Asian Non-Proliferation Research Center, which will be established as a private non-profit organization. This Center should pursue interdisciplinary approach, consisted of policy research and technological research development. The Center should be composed by multinational researchers, and
- (4) More effective use of non-governmental organizations in the field of nuclear energy. Some examples are WANO, Uranium Institute. We should recommend to these organizations to pay much attention to the Asian non-proliferation situations.