

**Proposals for Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Reinforcing
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Toward a Simultaneous Solution to Global Warming and Energy Security
(Abstract)**

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Study Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

These proposals to the Japanese government and to the international community have been developed by a Study Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation headed by Mr. Shunji Yanai, former Ambassador of Japan to the United States of America, through careful examination over several years of the circumstances described below.

Background

- * Global warming and energy security are both important issues that are directly linked with the lives of citizens. Nuclear energy has been attracting increasing attention for its potential role as an effective means of addressing these two issues simultaneously.
- * However, in order for nuclear power to fulfill its expected role into the future, it is vital to work on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation initiatives.
- * In addition to the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel have not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT and subsequent nuclear testing, suspicions that Iran and other countries are developing nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear terrorism by non-State actors are all signs of the increasingly extensive menace of nuclear proliferation.
- * In order to deal with the menace of this sort of nuclear proliferation, there is a need for stronger control measures on peaceful use of nuclear energy. Nuclear-weapon States will need to make efforts towards nuclear disarmament in order for non-nuclear-weapon States to concede new control measures.

Proposals

1. Enhancing the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

- (1) Enhancing the IAEA's verification function
 - (i) In order to achieve the universal conclusion of Additional Protocol to the existing safeguards agreements, the G8 countries should agree to make the

supply of nuclear-related equipment, materials or technology conditional on concluding an Additional Protocol.

- (ii) In order to strengthen the IAEA's verification function, a system should be established that allows comprehensive verification based on analysis of public information.

(2) Collaborating with the Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which manages nuclear-related exports, does not have a mechanism to verify compliance, but should collaborate with the IAEA to create a system for verifying end use and end users. The IAEA would benefit from such links with the NSG in that it would receive information useful for its own verification activities.

(3) Developing proliferation-resistant technologies

Systems for international collaboration should be established and strengthened under IAEA leadership to develop technologies that provide proliferation resistance, and Japan should work towards worldwide propagation of its advanced proliferation-resistant technology.

2. Strengthening initiatives that supplement the NPT regime

(1) Institutionalizing nuclear fuel supply assurance

To prevent the proliferation of sensitive technology while at the same time enabling stable supplies of fuel to be secured, the various proposals for systems to provide nuclear fuel supply guarantees should be integrated and made a reality.

(2) Strengthening and promoting export control and interdiction activities

In addition to ensuring the implementation by all States of Security Council Resolution 1540, which imposes an obligation to put in place systems for export controls, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to prevent nuclear-related equipment and materials that have slipped past export controls from being unloaded at their destinations should be promoted, and ratification of the similarly-motivated Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation should be encouraged.

(3) Enhancing nuclear security

To prevent nuclear terrorism, international norms relating to nuclear security must be strengthened by the IAEA and applied rigorously by all States, and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, must be promoted.

3. Promoting nuclear disarmament and effective use of materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

(1) Nuclear disarmament

For the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, the *de jure* and *de facto* nuclear-weapon States should properly meet their obligations relating to nuclear disarmament. Some of the most important measures that should be taken are ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a continued moratorium on nuclear tests until the CTBT enters into force, immediate commencement of negotiations and early agreement on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons until an FMCT is concluded. For the U.S. and Russia, important issues include the extension of or a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I), and complete implementation and extension of or replacement for the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT).

(2) Peaceful use of materials from dismantled nuclear weapons

In addition to using the uranium obtained by dismantling nuclear weapons as fuel for light water reactors, the accelerated reuse of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons as MOX fuel should be advocated by Japan.

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