The foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation framework is consisted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the NPT, three pillars of the treaty; “nuclear disarmament”, “nuclear non-proliferation” and “peaceful use of nuclear energy” called “Grand Bargain” are stipulated as the deal of obligation between the nuclear weapons states (NWSs) and the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWSs). The treaty was signed by 190 states since the entry into force in 1970 and it has been reviewed every five years after the indefinite extension in 1995.
Based on the obligation of “nuclear non-proliferation” in Article I and II of the NPT, safeguards as the verification measure to ensure the non-proliferation obligation is stipulated in Article III. In conformity with the Article III-1 of the NPT, IAEA verifies the nuclear activities of a state by concluding a Model text of Safeguards Agreement (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement) 1 with respective states parties of the NPT. In 1990’s, clandestine nuclear development by Iraq and DPRK indicated limitation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and IAEA made Model Additional Protocol2 which includes strengthened verification capability of the IAEA. Since 2002, IAEA has been applied integrated safeguards to the states which are confirmed the transparency on the nuclear activities through the implementation of safeguards agreement and additional protocol.
Although the treaty is yet to enter into force, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also constitutes part of nuclear non-proliferation framework by banning nuclear explosive test. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)3 aims prohibition of production of weapon grade fissile materials but the negotiation of the treaty has not started yet. Five Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ) were established complementary to global non-proliferation framework.
In the second layer of the nuclear non-proliferation framework, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)provides guidelines for export control of nuclear related materials and equipment and regulates them. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)4 launched in 2003 intends to interdict transfer and transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials. United Nations Security Council Resolution 15405 adopted in 2004 aims prevention of WMD proliferation to non-state actors.
- INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)
- INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)
- A/RES/67/53
Japan’s View on a FMCT
- Statement of Interdiction Principles
- S/RES/1540
Overview of the Nuclear Security |
After the 9.11, international society more concerned potential threats of illicit transition of nuclear and radioactive materials which leads nuclear and radioactive terrorism. To detect and prevent it, IAEA sets Nuclear Security Plan in addition to amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material1. Other than IAEA, UN adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism2 in 2005 and the Nuclear Security Summit has been convened since 2010 by the U.S.s’ initiative.
- INFCIRC/274
- A/RES/59/290
Japan’s efforts on Nuclear Non-proliferation |
..By making use of its experience as a non-nuclear armed country, Japan will also actively contribute to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation through reinforcement of the IAEA safeguards and stringent export control and international nuclear security through actively participating global initiative such as nuclear security summits. In particular, in the non-proliferation field, it is important to intensify the efforts toward the nuclear non-proliferation by promoting international collaboration in enhancing proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel, and R&D to strengthen technology of nuclear forensics, detection and safeguards, etc. Japan will go through these efforts in cooperation with the countries such as the U.S. and France. GOJ will also set up an integrated implementing body to support development of human resources, institutional infrastructure and other for countries that will development of human resources, institutional infrastructure and others for countries that will newly introduce nuclear power, through cooperation with international organizations such as the IAEA.
(Strategic Energy Plan (Provisional Translation) April, 2014)
Related Documents and Links
Japan accepted the IAEA Safeguards based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol, and has been making efforts to ensure transparency of its nuclear activities including the use of plutonium.
Japan believes that the most practical and effective way to enhance the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is to have as many countries as possible conclude the Additional Protocol, and thus has been actively working towards the universalization of the Additional Protocol.
(Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (5th Edition), MOFA 2011.)
The IAEA Board of Governors in June 2015 concluded that “the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities.” (Broader Conclusion) in Japan based on IAEA safeguards activities implemented during 2014.
(2015 The Status of Plutonium Management in Japan)
Related Documents and links
- GOV/2015/30
- INFCIRC/255
This is a report on the current status of plutonium management in Japan. In recognition of the importance of securing nuclear non-proliferation throughout research, development and utilization of nuclear energy, the Japanese Government has strictly controlled all nuclear materials and activities, putting it under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Especially for plutonium, the Japanese Government has firmly maintained the principle of not possessing plutonium reserves whose purpose of utilization is unspecified. In order to assure its transparency domestically and internationally, Japan has published the status of plutonium management including usage and stockpile both within and outside Japan since 1994. Japan has also annually reported the status to the IAEA in conformity with the “Guideline for the Management of Plutonium.”
(2015 The Status of Plutonium Management in Japan)
The Status of Plutonium Management
21 Jul 2015 The Status of Plutonium Management in Japan
Related Documents
- INFCIRC/549
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Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
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..Japan actively promotes peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and, with its highly advanced nuclear technologies also assumes responsibility to implement strict export controls on nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, so as to be alert to the misuse of such technology and forestall the development of nuclear weapons in other countries by all means. Therefore, Japan has redoubled its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the NSG. Japan contributes positively to the activities of the NSG by, for example. Assuming the role of the Point of Contact (POC) through its Permanent Mission to International Organizations in Vienna.
(Japan’s Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy (Fifth Edition), MOFA 2011.)
..As the only country that has suffered from nuclear bombings at war, and as a nation possessing advanced nuclear energy capabilities, Japan strives all the time to ensure the 3Ss, Safeguards, Safety and Security, which are essential for advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Restricting the uses of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes, Japan has an impeccable and long standing track record in the IAEA safeguards. Japan underwent the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. We have been sharing the lessons learned, useful not only for Safety but also Security in the context of counter-terrorism.
(Summary Statement by Prime Minister Abe at the Hague Nuclear security Summit. March 24, 2014)
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