## The Status Report of Plutonium Management in Japan - 2017 -

July, 31, 2018

Office of Atomic Energy Policy Cabinet Office

#### 1. Preface

Japan has been limiting its research, development and use of nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes under the Atomic Energy Basic Act.

From the viewpoint of peaceful use under the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, and under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), all nuclear materials and activities in Japan are subject to the stringent safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thus guaranteeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Japan\*.

In addition, Japan upholds the principles of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes guided by the policy of peaceful use. Given the importance of enhancing transparency and gaining public understanding on use of plutonium at home and abroad, Japan has published the status report of management of unirradiated separated plutonium (hereinafter referred to as "separated plutonium") including usage and stockpile both within and outside of Japan since 1994. Moreover, Japan has also reported the status annually to the IAEA in conformity with the "Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium." In this report, Japan publishes the use, storage status and other items at each facility in a more detailed manner than required by the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium to further improve its transparency.

2. The Current Status of Separated Plutonium Management in Japan

#### (1) Overview

As of the end of 2017, the total amount of separated plutonium both managed within and outside of Japan was approximately 47.3 tons, approximately 10.5 tons of which was held domestically and the rest of approximately 36.7 tons was held abroad.

The stockpile held abroad was separated from spent fuel of Japanese nuclear power plants in reprocessing facilities in the UK and France under contracts with Japanese electric utilities. ①Reprocessing of spent fuel contracted out to France has been completed and approximately 15.5 tons of separated plutonium is held there as of the end of 2017. This is down 0.7 ton from the end of 2016 (16.2 tons) due to the transports of fabricated MOX fuels from France to Japan. ②As for the reprocessing of spent fuel contracted out to the UK, approximately 21.2 tons of separated plutonium, which includes 0.4 tons of plutonium newly allocated and added to the stock in 2017,

<Unit: t Pu>

is held in the UK. Approximately, 0.6 ton of plutonium from the remaining spent fuel contracted out to the UK is expected to be added to the stockpile around by 2019, when the reprocessing facility in the UK is scheduled to be closed.

			As of the end of 2016	As of the end of 2017	
	Total			46.9	47.3
	Held in Japan			9.8	10.5
	(Total)			37.1	36.7
	Held abroad	abroad Breakdown	UK	20.8	21.2
			France	16.2	15.5

#### The Status of Separated Plutonium Management

(Note) All figure are approximate numbers.

#### (2) The Data in the Attachment

The status of separated plutonium management in Japan as of the end of 2017 is given bellow. The amounts of separated plutonium in tables are given in kilograms unless otherwise mentioned. Figures in brackets are the data published last year.

"Separated plutonium held in Japan" in Section 1-(1) of the Attachment is unirradiated separated plutonium in the process between separation from spent fuel, fabrication into MOX fuel powder at reprocessing facilities, fabrication into MOX fuel assemblies from MOX fuel powder at fuel fabrication facilities, and loaded into a reactor core but yet to be irradiated. Such plutonium is held in the following facilities:

- Reprocessing facilities: in the state of plutonium nitrate in the separation and purification processes, or of plutonium oxide both in the co-conversion process and in containers.
- 2) Fuel fabrication facilities: plutonium oxide held as raw materials, in the stage of testing or fabrication, or contained in newly fabricated fuels.
- 3) Nuclear reactors and other facilities: plutonium oxide contained in unirradiated new fuels held at Joyo, Monju and commercial reactor sites (this includes fresh MOX fuels loaded into the reactor core but yet to be irradiated, and such fuels unloaded from the reactor core without having been irradiated), and those held for research at R & D facilities of universities or institutes, and those in fuels for critical assemblies.

"Separated plutonium held abroad" in Section 1-(2) of the Attachment is plutonium that has been separated by reprocessors in the UK and France under contracts with Japanese electric utilities, but not yet returned to Japan. Basically, such plutonium is to be fabricated into MOX fuels overseas and be utilized at light water reactors (LWRs) in Japan. "Utilization of separated plutonium from Jan. to Dec., 2017" in Sections 2-(1), (2), and (3) of the Attachment is to provide further clarity of the plutonium management. It shows the amount of plutonium oxide form recovered at reprocessing facilities, the net amount of plutonium transferred to fabrication process of the fuel fabrication facilities and the amount of fresh MOX fuels loaded into the reactors and irradiated. (Additional reference information) Since the following operation was conducted after January 2018, it is not reported in this report.

At the Genkai Nuclear Power Station Unit3 of Kyushu Electric Power Co., unirradiated MOX fuel with 640kg of separated plutonium was loaded in nuclear reactor was irradiated in March 2018. This decrease is not included in this report, which covers the status of plutonium management as of the end of 2017, but has decreased from the end of 2017.

\* : The broader conclusion for Japan, 2017

Under the Treaty on the NPT, based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement concluded with the IAEA and its Additional Protocol, Japan accepts safeguards by the IAEA on all nuclear materials including plutonium in Japan.

The IAEA's Board of Governors held in June 2018 has affirmatively concluded that the safeguards implemented by the IAEA in 2017 found that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities (The broader conclusion) on the basis that there are no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Japan.

Also attached are the following five references.

#### [References]

- Reference 1 The amount of separated plutonium held in nuclear reactors and other facilities in Japan as of the end of the year 2017.
- Reference 2 The balance of separated plutonium held in Japan as of the end of the year 2017.
- Reference 3 The Status of Separated Plutonium in Japan (2017) (illustration)
- Reference 4 The amount of plutonium held in Japan as of the end of the year 2017 published by the IAEA under *the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium*.
- Reference 5 The amount of plutonium held in each country as of the end of the year 2016 published by the IAEA under *the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium*.

#### Attachment

The Status of Separated Plutonium Management in Japan as of the end of the year 2017 1. Separated plutonium in storage

#### (1) Separated plutonium held in Japan

#### (Previous year's figures in brackets)

#### <Unit: kg Pu>

g Facilities				Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Tokai Reprocessing Plant	Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant	Total
ssing	Breakdown		trate, etc. (Dissolved d for reprocessing)	26(27)	275(276)	300(303)
Reprocessing	(Note 1) Plutonium oxide (held as mixed oxide in containers)		233(281)	3,329(3,329)	3,563(3,610)	
Total			259(309)	3,604(3,604)	3,863(3,913)	
		Fissile Plutonium	169(202)	2,342(2,342)	2,511(2,544)	

(Note 1) Changes of the figures may occur not only from the conversion of plutonium nitrate into plutonium-oxides, but also from possible samplings for analysis and inspection purposes and the transfer between the reprocessing, storage and fabrication facilities.

ies				JAEA Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facilities
Facilities		Plutonium o oxide contai	xide (held in plutonium ners)	2,479(2,423)
	Breakdown (Note 2)	Plutonium in the stage of testing or fabrication New fuel, etc. (held as finished fuel assemblies, etc.)		928(936)
fabrication				446(446)
Fuel fa	Tot			3,854(3,805)
ш	101	ai	Fissile Plutonium	2,659(2,627)

(Note 2) Changes of the figures may occur not only from the material flows in the course of the fuel fabrication processes, but also possibly from the movements of materials between material balance areas in a facility caused by reuses of out-specification products, storing of new fuels.

Other			Joyo	Monju	Commercial Reactors	R&D Facilities (Note 3)	
rs and acilities	Unirradiated new fuel held at nuclear reactor sites,			282	2,300	113	
cil S	etc.		(134)	(282)	(1,597)	(113)	
Reactors Fac	ים די ני מי די מי די מי			2,829(2,126)			
Re	Fissile Plutonium		1,880(1,434)				

(Note 3) "R&D Facilities" includes critical assemblies and other R&D facilities.

		10,546(9,844)
Total	Fissile Plutonium	7,050(6,605)

#### (2) Separated plutonium held abroad (Note 4)

This is the plutonium that was separated by reprocessors in the UK and France under the reprocessing contracts with Japanese electric utilities. Basically, this plutonium is to be fabricated into MOX fuels overseas, and brought into Japan for use in light water reactors (LWRs). Thus, "Separated plutonium held abroad" should not be a concern from the peaceful use point of view. However, for the sake of better transparency, the current status of separated plutonium held abroad for the fabrication of fuel is also shown below.

<unit:< th=""><th>kα</th><th>Pus</th></unit:<>	kα	Pus
SOUL	ĸу	ru>

	Separated plutonium			
	Fissile Plutonium			
UK	21,232(20,839)	14,226(14,003)		
France	15,486(16,217)	10,039(10,513)		
Total	36,718(37,056)	24,265(24,516)		

(Note 4) Nuclear losses (refer to Note 2 of Reference 2) are taken into account in the assessment of the amount of plutonium held in reprocessing facilities.

2. Utilization of separated plutonium from Jan. to Dec., 2017


(Previous year's figures in brackets)

(1) The amount of plutonium-oxide recovered <Unit: kg Pu>

unt of	JAEA	JNFL	Total
um-oxide	Tokai	Rokkasho	
ed (Note	Reprocessing	Reprocessing	
5)	Plant	Plant	
Amo plutoniu recover	0 (244)	1 (0)	1 (244)

<sup>(</sup>Note 5) "The amount of plutonium-oxide recovered" is defined as the amount of plutonium in oxide form (MOX powder) converted from plutonium nitrate at reprocessing facilities.

(2) The amount of separated plutonium in fuel fabrication processes <Unit: kg Pu>



(Note 6) "The amount of separated plutonium in fuel fabrication processes" is defined as the net amount of plutonium transferred from raw materials storage areas into fabrication process areas at fuel fabrication facilities.

(3) The amount of MOX fuel loaded and irradiated in nuclear reactors <Unit: kg Pu>

	Nuclear Reactors
Amount of MOX fuel loaded and irradiated in nuclear reactors(Note 7)	0 (904)

(Note 7) "The amount of MOX fuel loaded and irradiated in nuclear reactors" is defined as the amount of unirradiated MOX fuel which was loaded in the nuclear reactors and then loaded into a reactor cores for use as fuel and irradiated. The MOX fuels that are loaded into the reactor cores are either unirradiated or in the process of irradiation. For the sake of clarity, the figure here specifically refers to the irradiated amount.

(Note 8) The total figures may not agree completely due to rounding.

#### **Provisional Translation**

[Reference 1]

#### The amount of separated plutonium held in nuclear reactors and other facilities in Japan as of the end of the year 2017.

	Facility name		Plutonium held(Note 1) (Unirradiated separated plutonium) Total (kg Pu) Fissile plutonium		Plutonium loaded into the reactors out of the "Plutonium held" in the left column (Note 2) (Unirradiated separated plutonium) Total (kg Pu) ; Fissile plutonium		(Reference Data)"Total amount of unirradiated separated plutonium loaded into the reactor cores by the end of the year 2017 " minus "Total amount of irradiated plutonium unloaded from the reactor cores" (Note 3) Total (kg Pu) Fissile plutonium		
			Јоуо	134	in total(kg Puf) 98	_	(kg Puf) —	261	(kg Puf) 184
Japa	Japan Atomic Energy Agency		Monju	282	193	251	171	1,533	1,069
	Tokyo	Tokyo Electric Power	Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3	_	_	_	-	210	143
ors	Company Holdings	Kashiwazaki Kariwa Unit 3	205	138	_		_	—	
Commercial Reactors	Chubu Electric Power Company Hamaoka Unit 4		213	145	_	-	_	—	
cial F	Kansai	Electric Power	Takahama Unit 3	181	117	_	-	1,088	688
nmei	C	Company	Takahama Unit 4	703	446	_	-	184	110
Cor	Shikoku	Electric Power Company Ikata Unit 3		198	136	-	-	633	436
	Kyushu	Electric Power Co	ompany Genkai Unit 3	801	516	—	-	677	468
Po	esearch	Japan Atomic	Deuterium Critical Assembly in Oarai R&D Center	87	72				
Deve	and elopment acilities	Energy Agency	Static Experiment Critical Facility and Transient Experiment Critical Facility in Tokai R&D Center	15	11				
		Other facilities		11	9				

(Note 1) Unirradiated separated plutonium held at the end of the year 2017

(Note 2) Plutonium loaded into the reactors out of the unirradiated separated plutonium held at the end of the year 2017

(Note 3) The figures represent the "Total amount of unirradated separated plutonium loaded into the reactor cores by the end of the year 2017" subtracted by the "Total amount of irradiated plutonium unloaded from the reactor cores by the end of the year 2017". It is equivalent to the weight of plutonium of the unirradiated MOX fuel staying in the reactor cores at the end of the year 2017, For commercial reactors, some irradiated fuels may be removed to spent fuel pools temporarily for periodic inspection.

Additional information for reference (as of the end of the year 2017):

·Irradiated plutonium contained in spent fuel in the storage facilities at reactor sites: 137,574kg Pu

• Irradiated plutonium contained in spent fuel in the storage facilities at reprocessing plants: 26,734kg Pu

• Small amount of plutonium contained in radioactive waste and recognized as irrecoverable for the time being: 137kg Pu

#### [Reference 2]

The Balance of Separated Plutonium held in Japan as of the end of the year 2017.

	<u>Unit: kg Pu</u>
< Variations during the year 2017> $^{(Note 1)}$	
Total amount of plutonium newly separated at reprocessing facilities	0
Total amount of plutonium returned from abroad	703
Variance in processes at facilities	△ 1
Balance	702

#### [JAEA Reprocessing Facility]

		ation and purification process to storage of ra	
	at co-c	conversion process in the reprocessing plant (	Note 1)
Inventory as	of Jan. 1, 2017 (th	e end of the year 2016)	309
	Plutonium ship	ped in (in 2017) : material for analysis	0
	Plutonium ship	△ 49	
	Variance in pro	Δ 1	
increase		Transfer to retained waste	△ 2.7
and decrease		Retransfer from retained waste	9.5
00010000	Breakdown	Nuclear loss	Δ 0.0
		Measured discard	Δ 7.5
		Material unaccounted for (MUF)	0.1
Inventory as	of Dec. 31, 2017		259

		— [JAEA Plutonium Fabrication Facility] ———	
	From ra	aw material of MOX to fuel assembly products (Note 1)	I
Inventory as of Jan. 1, 2017 (the end of the year 2016) (Note 3)		3,805	
	Plutonium shipped in (in 2017)		49
Ι. Γ	Plutonium shipped out (in 2017)		$\triangle$ 0
increase and	Variance in processes at fuel fabrication facilities (Note 2)		0
decrease	Breakdown	Retransfer from retained waste	0.0
decrease		Nuclear loss	△ 0.3
		Material unaccounted for (MUF)	0.4
Inventory as of Dec. 31, 2017		3,854	

#### \_\_\_\_\_ [Nuclear Reactors and Other Facilities] \_\_\_\_\_

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"Joyo", "Monju", "Commercial Reactors", and "R&D Facilities" (Note 1)			
Inventory as of Jan. 1, 2017 (the end of the year 2016) 2,126			
Plutonium shipped in (in 2017) The amount includes the plutonium returned from abroad reprocessing plants		703	
and decrease	Plutonium shipped out (in 2017)	△ 0	
	Variance at reactor sites <sup>(Note 2)</sup>	0	
	Breakdown Transfer to retained waste, etc.	0.0	
Inventory as of Dec. 31, 2017		2,829	

		[JNFL Reprocessing Plant]	
	From separ	ation and purification process to storage of rav	w material
	at mixed	conversion process in the reprocessing facility	y (Note 1)
Inventory as	of Jan. 1, 2017 (th	e end of the year 2016)	3,604
	Separation of plutonium (in 2017)		0
	Plutonium shipped in (in 2017): material for analysis		0
	Plutonium shipped out (in 2017): material for analysis		Δ 0
increase	Variance in processes at reprocessing facility (Note 2)		Δ 0
and decrease	Breakdown	Transfer to retained waste	△ 0.0
00010000		Retransfer from retained waste	0.0
		Nuclear loss	△ 0.7
		Material unaccounted for (MUF)	0.6
Inventory as of Dec. 31, 2017		3,604	

#### [INFL Depression Diant]

(Note 1) The total may not agree due to rounding. "△" indicates consequential decrease. "

(Note 2) The variances in processes at each facility includes, in addition to receipts into and shipments from the facility, inventory change in the material control and accounting (shipper/receiver difference, transfer to retained waste, retransfer from retained waste, nuclear loss, measured discard and so on), and material unaccounted for. The definition of inventory change and material unaccounted for are described below. These are concepts recognized internationally in the measurement and control of nuclear fuel materials. The variance that causes the reduction of inventory is shown with " $\Delta$ ".

O Shipper/receiver difference:

The difference between the quantity of nuclear fuel materials as status by the shipping side and that as measured by the receiving side when nuclear fuel materials are transferred between different facilities. O Transfer to retained waste:

Amount of the nuclear fuel materials that are removed from the book inventory, which is deemed to be in unrecoverable status for the time being but which is held, such as plutonium contained in high level radioactive liquid or low level radioactive liquid generated in the process of recovering nuclear fuel materials from spent fuel solution.

O Retransfer from retained waste:

Amount of the nuclear fuel materials that had been retained as waste but was re-classified as the book inventory in order to be processed for volume reduction and other purposes.

#### Ο Nuclear loss:

Amount of the loss (decrease) of nuclear fuel materials as a result of natural decay.

O Measured discard:

Amount of the nuclear fuel materials that has been measured or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way (vitrification, etc.) that is not suitable for further nuclear use.


O Material unaccounted for (MUF):

The difference between the book inventory and the physical inventory that is defined by actual measurement. MUF is inevitably generated from measurement error or adhesion of plutonium to equipment in a facility where plutonium is treated in powder or liquid state.

# The Status of Separated Plutonium in Japan (2017)

# Provisional Translation [Reference 3]

<u>Unit: kg Pu</u>



(Note 3) " $\Delta$ " indicates decrease.

#### [Reference 4]

### The Amount of Plutonium Held in Japan as of the end of the year 2017 published by the IAEA under *the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium*

(Previous year's figures in brackets			
Annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium *1		(Unit:tPu)	
1. Unirradiated separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants	3.9	(3.9)	
<ol> <li>Unirradiated separated plutonium in the course of manufacture or fabrication and plutonium contained in unirradiated semi- fabricated or unfinished products at fuel or other fabricating plants or elsewhere</li> <li>3.4</li> </ol>			
<ol> <li>Plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel, including that loaded into a reactor core prior to use, or other unirradiated plutonium in fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere</li> </ol>	3.2	(2.5)	
4. Unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere	0.1	(0.1)	
[Sum of lines 1-4 above]*2	[ 10.5	(9.8) ]	
( i ) Plutonium included in lines 1-4 above belonging to foreign bodies.	0	(0)	
(ii) Plutonium in any of the forms in lines 1-4 above held in locations in other countries and therefore not included above.	36.7 <sup>*3</sup>	(37.1 <sup>*3</sup> )	
(iii) Plutonium not included in lines 1-4 above which is in 0 international shipment prior to its arrival in the recipient State.			

Estimated amount of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fue			(Unit:t	Pu)
1. Plutonium contained in spent fuel at civil reactor sites.		138	(137)	
2. Plutonium contained in spent fuel at reprocessing plants.		27	(27)	
3. Plutonium contained in spent fuel held elsewhere.			(<0.5)	
[Sum of lines 1-3 above] <sup>*5</sup>	][	164	(164)	]
(Definition)				
Line 1: covers estimated amounts of plutonium contained in fuel discharged from civil reactors				
Line 2: covers estimated amounts of plutonium contained in fuel				
received at reprocessing plants but not yet reprocessed.				

\*1: Rounded to 100 kg plutonium.

\*2, 5: The sum is calculated for the sake of convenience and it is out of the scope of the report under the Guidelines.

\*3: Loss of Pu-241 due to radioactive decay is taken into account in the assessment of the amount of fissile plutonium held at the overseas reprocessing plants.

\*4: Rounded to 1,000 kg plutonium.

#### [Reference 5]

The Amount of Plutonium Held in Each Country as of the end of the year 2016 published by the IAEA under *the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium* 

		(Unit:t Pu)
	Unirradiated plutonium <sup>*1</sup>	Plutonium contained in spent fuel* <sup>2</sup>
US	49.4	668
Russia	57.2	155
UK	133.5	29
France	81.7	287.8
China <sup>*3</sup>	40.9kg	-
Japan	9.8	164
Germany	0.5	118.7
Belgium	< 50kg	41
Switzerland	< 2kg	20

\*1: Values rounded to 100 kg plutonium. The items reported as less than 50 kg are not included.

\*<sup>2</sup>: Values rounded to 1,000 kg plutonium, The items reported as less than 500 kg are not included.

\*<sup>3</sup>: China declared that it published only the amount of unirradiated plutonium.

#### [A short history of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium]

In Feb.1994, the nine countries, i.e. US, Russia, UK, France, China, Japan, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland started to deliberate on the establishment of an international framework aimed at enhancing the transparency of plutonium utilization.

In Dec.1997, these nine countries decided on *the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium* that provided the basic norms about plutonium management, transparency through publication of the amount of plutonium held in each country and the importance of non-proliferation.

In Mar.1998, the IAEA published for the first time the amount of plutonium held in each country and the policy of each country about plutonium utilization reported to the IAEA under the Guidelines.